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PART I: INTRODUCTION
When a person travels across the United States border, whether by
land, by air, or by sea, that person and their belongings may be subjected
to a warrantless search and seizure by a border patrol agent.1 According
to the Supreme Court, these searches do not require probable cause and
are reasonable by their very nature.2 This line of reasoning makes sense,
as the security at our borders is paramount,3 especially in the wake of the
September 11th attacks. Nevertheless, there has to be some line
established that the government cannot cross when conducting certain
border searches, particularly those involving significant privacy interests.
As technology advances and the digitalization of our personal lives
continues to increase, the search of personal electronic devices raises
unique border security concerns, now more than ever.
In United States v. Seljan, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the border
search doctrine cannot stand for the idea that “at the border, ‘anything
goes.’”4 Moreover, the Supreme Court raised its own concerns in United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, suggesting that there was a limited scope
as to what could be considered “routine” customs searches and
inspections.5 The problem then becomes defining what can be considered
a non-routine border search, and the level of suspicion that is required
before conducting such a search.6 While the government’s interest in
searches at our international borders is significant, it must still be weighed
against important individual privacy interests. In performing this
balancing of the interests, “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
analysis remains reasonableness.”7
Thus, as our lives continue to become more and more intertwined
with our electronic devices, one’s digital life can be seen as an extension
of that person’s real life, as these devices “contain the most intimate details
1 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 (2010) (stating that “All persons, baggage, and merchandise
arriving in the Customs territory of the United States from places outside thereof are liable
to inspection and search by a Customs officer”); see also Border Security: At Ports of
Entry, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (last visited Feb. 7, 2015),
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry (stating that “U.S. Customs and Border
Protection has a complex mission at ports of entry with broad law enforcement authorities
tied to screening all foreign visitors, returning American citizens and imported cargo that
enters the U.S. at more than 300 land, air and sea ports.”).
2 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
3 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
4 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States
v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008)(en banc)).
5 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
6 Id. at n.4 (“we suggest no view on what level of suspicion, if any, is required for
nonroutine border searches”) (emphasis added).
7 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 539 (1985)).
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of our lives.”8 Although border searches of electronic devices “have
yielded evidence of illegal conduct[,]” such searches still raise a number
of “significant privacy concerns.”.9
The Fourth Circuit was the first court to address whether border
searches of electronic devices require a heightened standard in United
States v. Ickes, holding that suspicion is not necessary to perform such
searches.10 Recognizing that intrusive searches of a person’s electronic
devices invoke special concerns, the Ninth Circuit departed from this
suspicionless standard and instead adopted the view that border agents
should have at least a “reasonable suspicion” before searching a person’s
electronic devices.11 The United States Supreme Court should adopt a
reasonable suspicion standard to resolve this circuit split, and preserve
important individual liberty interests.
Part II of this Comment provides the background of relevant sources
to this debate, discussing the factual background of United States v.
Cotterman and evolution of the border search doctrine as a whole. Part III
analyzes these sources, discussing the aptness of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, and highlighting where the other circuits have faltered in their
analysis. Part IV concludes this Comment.
PART II: BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background of United States v. Cotterman
Howard Cotterman and his wife were crossing the United StatesMexico border in April 2007. During a primary inspection, border agents
came across a hit on the Treasury Enforcement Communications System
(“TECS”).12 TECS indicated to the border agent conducting the inspection
that Cotterman was not only a sex offender, but possibly involved in child
sex tourism as well.13 As a result of the hit, the agents subsequently
searched Cotterman’s vehicle, where they found two laptops and three
digital cameras.14 A cursory search of these devices revealed that they
contained both personal photographs as well as password-protected files.15
8

Id. at 964.
Mary Ellen Callahan, Privacy issues in border searches of electronic devices, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, (October 2009), available at http://www
.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacyprivacyissuesborder_searcheselectronicdevices.p
df
10 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005).
11 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966.
12 Id. at 957.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 957–58.
9
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The border agents contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) for further instruction in handling the search.16 ICE informed the
agents that the alert was part of a system that identified registered sex
offenders in an effort to fight child sex tourism.17 Due to the nature of the
hit, ICE advised the agents to review any electronic devices, such as his
computers and cameras, in order to discover whether Cotterman was in
possession of child pornography.18
Although the border agents were able to view some of the files on
Cotterman’s computer, many of the files were still password-protected,
and therefore inaccessible.19 At this point, ICE agents were en-route to the
Port of Entry, deciding to perform a more intrusive search of Cotterman’s
laptops when they arrived.20 Although Cotterman initially offered to help
access those files that were password-protected, the agents declined
Cotterman’s offer, fearing that Cotterman might delete the files, or that the
computer itself was “booby trapped.”21
The subsequent search revealed seventy-five images of child
pornography on Cotterman’s laptop. Notwithstanding this discovery, the
password-protected files on the laptop were still inaccessible.22 The agent
who performed the search, ICE Senior Special Agent & Computer
Forensic Examiner John Owen, conceded at this point that he would need
Cotterman’s help in order to access the protected files. Yet Cotterman
never showed up to assist Agent Owen.23 After another attempt to gain
his assistance, Cotterman responded that the computer had multiple users.
Cotterman informed Agent Owen that he would need to contact these other
people to retrieve their passwords.24
Despite Cotterman’s lack of assistance, Agent Owen finally opened
the files on April 11. Access to these additional files revealed another 378
images of child pornography. The vast majority of these images were of
the same girl over a two-to-three-year period, and many depicted
Cotterman sexually molesting other children as well.25 A continued search
over the next few months revealed hundreds more files, including images,
stories and videos of children.26 When Cotterman’s case went to trial, the
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 958.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 958–59.
Id. at 959.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 959.
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government “sought a broad ruling that no suspicion of any kind was
required” to perform these searches on Cotterman’s laptops.27
B. Evolution of the Border Search Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”28
When a search occurs, it implicates this right so long as the individual has
a subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation is one that society
objectively recognizes as reasonable.29 Thus, “the ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”30
While obtaining a judicial warrant may generally fulfill this
requirement,31 a search may, nevertheless, be deemed reasonable if it falls
within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.32 These exceptions
include: exigent circumstances,33 automobile searches,34 inventory
searches,35 consent searches,36 searches in plain view,37 Terry “Stops and
Frisks,”38 searches incident to arrest,39 and occasions where special needs

27

Id.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
29 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring).
30 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
31 Vernonia School Dist. 47JA v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
32 Riley v. California, —- U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
33 See, e.g., Brigham City, 547 U.S. 398 (allowing a warrantless search when there is
an “objectively reasonable” belief that a person is seriously injured or threatened with such
injury); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 (1978)(reasoning that warrantless entry
should be allowed to put out a fire and investigate its cause).
34 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1991)(holding that police may,
without a warrant, search an automobile and the containers within it wherever they have
probable cause to believe the contraband may be contained).
35 See Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, —- U.S. ——, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1517
(2012)(noting that deference is given to correctional officers when performing inventory
searches of inmates); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976)(applying the
inventory search exception to impounded vehicles).
36 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)(reasoning that voluntary
consent to a search eliminates the warrant requirement).
37 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)(stating that the exception
applies “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its
incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of
access to the object.”).
38 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)(stating that objective reasonableness is the
proper inquiry in these types of searches).
39 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969)(reasoning that the two
justifications for this type of warrantless search are for officer safety and to prevent the
destruction or concealment of evidence).
28
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allow for a search to be performed without a warrant.40 The Supreme
Court has specifically justified warrantless searches at the United States
borders under this latter-most category.
The United States Supreme Court has long upheld the
constitutionality of unwarranted border searches.41 As such, the Court has
specifically recognized that, “[t]ravelers may be so stopped in crossing an
international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably
requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come
in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.”42 As
part of this longstanding tradition, the Court reached a landmark decision
in 1977 case United States v. Ramsey.43 In Ramsey, the Court expanded
the idea of a border search exception by addressing the reasonableness of
such searches. The Court reasoned that:
[b]order searches . . . from before the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, have been considered to be “reasonable” by the single fact
that the person or item in question had entered into our country from
outside. There has never been any additional requirement that the
reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable
cause.44
Such a broad exception, however, yields complications when applied
to more intrusive border searches. In United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, the Court was charged with deciding what level of
intrusiveness could negate the presumption of reasonableness.45
In Montoya de Hernandez, customs officials performed a rectal
examination on the defendant, discovering that she had been smuggling a
balloon filled with cocaine in her alimentary canal.46 The defendant
argued that such a search was unreasonable. The Supreme Court
disagreed, noting that “[w]hat is reasonable depends upon all of the
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the
40 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624
(1989)(reasoning that “[i]n limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated
by the search are minimal, and where an important government interest furthered by the
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a
search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.”); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1980)(applying the special needs doctrine to searches in schools, reasoning
that a “less exacting” standard than probable cause is required).
41 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see also Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
42 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
43 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 605 (1977)(discussing the constitutionality of a
warrantless search involving an individual’s international letter-class mail).
44 Id. at 619.
45 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
46 Id. at 535.
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search or seizure itself.”47 The Court drew on the distinction between
ordinary searches and seizures, and those that occur at international
borders.48 The Court reasoned that “the detention of a traveler at the
border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is
justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts
surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler
is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.”49 While the Court’s
holding did not require that border patrol agents have probable cause, as
in the case of normal searches, Montoya de Hernandez opened the door to
the suggestion that certain types of border searches will not be deemed
reasonable simply due to the fact that they occurred at a United States
border.
The Supreme Court further distinguished the varying levels of border
searches in United States v. Flores-Montano, when customs officials
seized marijuana from the defendant’s gas tank.50 As part of their search,
the customs officials “remov[ed] and disassembl[ed] the tank” to discover
the defendant’s contraband.51 The Ninth Circuit, citing Montoya de
Hernandez, had argued that the customs officials needed reasonable
suspicion before their search of the tank.52 The Supreme Court rejected
this application of a reasonable suspicion standard, instead asserting that:
[R]easons that might support a requirement of some level of
suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person –
dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched – simply
do not carry over to vehicles. Complex balancing tests to
determine what is a “routine” search of a vehicle, as opposed to a
more “intrusive” search of a person, have no place in border
searches of vehicles.53

While the Court thus alluded to the fact that a heightened standard
might be required when dealing with more “highly intrusive searches,”54
it has yet to address the distinction between those border searches that do
and those that do not require reasonable suspicion.

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 537.
Id. at 537–39.
Id. at 541.
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 152.
Id.
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C. The Fourth Circuit’s Findings in United States v. Ickes
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit to directly examine the
question of whether any level of suspicion was required for border
searches of personal electronic devices. In United States v. Ickes,55 the
defendant was convicted of transporting child pornography across a
United States border due to the images found on his computer.56 When
Ickes came to the United States-Canada border, he claimed to be on his
way home from vacation, but the primary inspector at the border was wary
of this assertion. The inspector’s suspicions came about because the van
that Ickes was traveling in seemed to contain “everything he own[ed].”57
The inspector therefore referred Ickes to a secondary inspection station.58
During the search at the secondary station, one of the agent’s
“suspicions were raised” after viewing a video that seemingly focused on
“a young ball boy at a tennis match”.59 With this heightened level of
awareness, the agent commenced a fuller search of the defendant’s van.60
After searching the vehicle, the agent and his colleague discovered drugs
and child pornography, as well as a warrant for Ickes’ arrest.61 The agents
confiscated Ickes’ computer, along with “75 disks containing additional
child pornography.”62 At trial, Ickes filed a motion to suppress the
evidence found on his computer and these disks, claiming they were
obtained through a warrantless search in violation of his rights under the
First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution.63
As part of its analysis, the Fourth Circuit looked to the language of
19 U.S.C.A. §1581(a). This statute provides, in relevant part:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any
vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the
customs waters . . . or at any other authorized place . . . and
examine the manifest and other documents and papers and
examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part
thereof and any person, trunk, package or cargo on board.64

55

United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 502.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. Although the court ultimately rejects a standard that would necessitate any raised
level of suspicion for a search of electronic devices, it is interesting to note here that the
circumstances surrounding this search probably would have met a reasonable suspicion
standard regardless.
60 Ickes, 393 F.3d at 503.
61 Id. at 503.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 19 U.S.C.A. §1581(a) (1954).
56
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The defendant argued that because the statute contained no explicit
reference to electronic equipment, the search of his computer and disks
were unsupported by the statutory authority.65 The court rejected this
argument, focusing on the statute’s use of the term “cargo” to support its
findings.66
The court noted that “cargo” was defined by Black’s Law Dictionary
as those “goods transported by a vessel, airplane, or vehicle.”67 Because
the computer and disks were “cargo” within this meaning and because it
was “undisputed that [these items] were being transported by [Icke’s]
vehicle” at the time that the search was conducted, the search was
authorized by § 1581.68 The court likewise found that the use of the word
“any” five times in the statute indicated that the 19 U.S.C.A. §1581(a)
should be construed broadly.69 Furthermore, the court reasoned that past
cases have also supported this tendency to read §1581 expansively.70 Any
other reading, according to the court, would “undermine the long-standing
practice of seizing goods at the border even when the type of good is not
specified in the statute.”71
Ickes also argued that the search of his computer and disks was in
violation of his rights under the United States Constitution.72 He claimed
that despite the government’s interests of protecting the borders, these
interests did not outweigh his own privacy interests.73 The court
disagreed, focusing on the Supreme Court’s rationale in Flores-Montano
that:
[t]he government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted
persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border. Time
and again, we have stated that searches made at the border . . . are
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact they occur at the border.74

This government interest in protecting and patrolling the border
substantially outweighed whatever privacy interest Ickes claimed to have
in his electronic devices. The authority under the border search doctrine,
the court explained, “has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment
itself.”75
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 505 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004)).
Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505. (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977)).

440

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 11:431

The Fourth Circuit likewise refused to create an exception to the
border search doctrine, grounded in the First Amendment.76 Ickes argued,
unsuccessfully, that the content on his computer and disks were
“expressive” and therefore were protected by his First Amendment
rights.77 In rejecting Ickes’ contention, the court suggested that the
proposition would create “significant headaches for those forced to
determine the scope” of the exception.78 Additionally, it would force
border agents to decide “on their feet” what material is covered by the First
Amendment. After making this determination, and if covered by the
exception, the agents would then have to decide whether or not probable
cause exists before they can conduct a search.79 The court reasoned that
“[t]he essence of border search doctrine is a reliance upon the trained
observations and judgments of customs officials, rather than upon
constitutional requirements applied to the inapposite context of this sort of
search.”80
PART III: ANALYSIS
A. The Unique Characteristics of Personal Electronic Devices
Intrusive searches of a person’s electronic devices are inherently
different from searches performed on other belongings. By their very
nature, these devices contain significantly more information about an
individual’s personal life than any other type of luggage that one may carry
at an international border. In fact, “[e]very computer is akin to a vast
warehouse of information.”81 The types of data contained on computers
run the gamut from the impersonal to the highly personal. With the rapid
advances of modern technology, this range is ever increasing.82
Notwithstanding this fact, computer users might not even know about
much of the information that is stored on these devices, much less be able
to control it.83 Much of what a person believes they have deleted or
76

Id. at 506.
Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 507.
81 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 542
(Dec. 2005).
82 See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Apple Watch Review: Bliss, but Only at a Steep Learning
Curve,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
8,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04
/09/technology/personaltech/apple-watch-bliss-but-only-after-a-steep-learning-curve.htm
l?_r=0/ (reviewing the Apple’s revolutionary smartwatch concept, and explaining that “the
most exciting thing about the Apple Watch isn’t the device itself, but the new tech vistas
that may be opened by the first mainstream wearable computer.”)
83 Id.
77
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removed remains on the device in some form, despite the attempted
erasure, “mak[ing] it impractical, if not impossible, for individuals to
make meaningful decisions regarding what digital content to expose to the
scrutiny that accompanies international travel.” 84
When a person is subjected to an extensive search of one’s digital
life, absent any sort of reasonable suspicion, a person is likely to feel a
level of violation approaching that of a strip search. Such a search exposes
the very intimate details of that person’s life, equivalent more to a line-byline combing through one’s diary than to the impersonal search of a car.85
Furthermore:
[u]nlike searches involving a reassembled gas tank or small hole
in the bed of a pickup truck, which have minimal or no impact
beyond the search itself—and little implication for an individual’s
dignity and privacy interests—the exposure of confidential and
personal information has permanence. It cannot be undone.
Accordingly, the uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic
devices carries with it a significant expectation of privacy and thus
renders an exhaustive exploratory search more intrusive than with
other forms of property.86

Due to these stark differences, the data that is collected after an
intrusive forensic search should not be conflated with other types of
luggage that a person carries across the border.87 This information is not
mere luggage, but rather an extension of the person.88 It is this
interconnection between the person and the device that necessitates a
heightened standard before conducting an intrusive search.
Not only is the nature of the search results inherently different from
that which other border searches yield, but the nature of the search itself
similarly differs. For instance, “the computer search process tends to be
more labor intensive and thorough than the physical search of a home.”89
If this contention is correct, it follows that such searches cannot be
84

United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 963.
86 Id. at 966 (citations omitted).
87 See, e.g., Christine A. Coletta, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the
Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971, 1001 (Sept.
2007)(“Because a computer can contain vast amounts of data that a passenger is unlikely
to pack for a vacation or trip, a search through its hard drive is not analogous to looking
through a person’s luggage, wallet, or automobile. It is much more personal, and implicates
dignity and privacy interests that should contribute to a finding that a laptop search is
intrusive”).
88 John W. Nelson, Border Confidential: Why Searches of Laptop Computers at the
Border Should Require Reasonable Suspicion, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 137, 140 (2007).
89 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 544
(Dec. 2005)(emphasis added).
85
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classified as “routine” under Montoya de Hernandez. It is for these
reasons, among others, that the Cotterman court applied a reasonable
suspicion standard to border searches of personal electronic devices.90
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Findings in United States v. Cotterman
Prior to its decision in Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit had developed
its own understanding of the border search doctrine through prior case law.
In United States v. Ramos-Saenz, the court attempted to define what the
Supreme Court meant by a “nonroutine” border search, reasoning that “a
border search goes beyond the routine only when it reaches the degree of
intrusiveness present in a strip search or a body cavity search.”91 In
fashioning this definition, similar to the Supreme Court’s distinction in
Flores de Montano, the court recognized that there was some level of
intrusiveness that would bring a border search beyond that which was
simply “routine,” and thus reasonable per se.92
The Ninth Circuit, however, initially declined to extend this
reasoning when it first examined the question of whether the doctrine
would apply to personal electronic devices in United States v. Arnold.93 In
Arnold, the court specifically held that “reasonable suspicion is not needed
to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the
border.”94 Despite this holding, the unique characteristics of personal
electronic devices themselves caused the court to reexamine the doctrine’s
application to searches of these devices five years later, and flatly reject
that reasoning when it decided United States v. Cotterman.95
In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Supreme Court precedent
in order to reach its ultimate conclusion that reasonable suspicion is
necessary for extensive border searches of personal electronic devices.96
The court began by examining the subject of searches and seizures at
United States borders in general. “The broad contours of the scope of
searches at our international borders are rooted in ‘the long-standing right
of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and
property crossing into this country.’”97 The court stated that the language
of Ramsey led to the development of the rule that border searches are
reasonable purely because they occur at the border.98 Nevertheless, the
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962–68 (9th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id.
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1008.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962.
Id. at 960.
Id. (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)).
Id.
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court asserted that this was not the end of the matter. The court limited
Ramsey, proclaiming that the holding “does not mean . . . that at the border
‘anything goes.’”99 Instead, the key factor remains the “reasonableness”
of the search, which depends, in turn, on the totality of the
circumstances.100
The court recognized that Officer Alvarado’s initial search of
Cotterman’s laptop did not require reasonable suspicion because it was
akin to a cursory scan of a package.101 The court acknowledged that,
“[h]ad the search of Cotterman’s laptop ended with [the initial search, it]
would be inclined to recognize it was reasonable even without
particularized suspicion.”102 But the “reasonableness” of the forensic
examination was, in the court’s view, a far more difficult issue to
determine.103
The court began by declining to treat the forensic examination of
Cotterman’s laptop as a so-called “extended border search,” which require
particularized suspicion in order to proceed.104 Judge Smith’s dissent
argued that the forensic examination would qualify as such a search
because it occurred around one hundred and seventy miles from the border
and several days after Cotterman attempted to enter the country.105 The
majority, however, rejected this proposition.106 Rather, the majority
reasoned that the doctrine was “best confined to cases in which, after an
apparent border crossing or functional entry, an attenuation in the time or
the location of conducting a search reflects that the subject has regained
an expectation of privacy.”107 In this case, although Cotterman was
allowed to leave the inspection station, his laptop never left the possession
of the border agents.108 Therefore, Cotterman never regained the
expectation of privacy recognized by the extended border search
doctrine.109
The court similarly disregarded the argument that the forensic
examination would qualify as a functional border search.110 This doctrine
involving searches at the “functional equivalent” of United States borders,
99

Id. (quoting United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008)(en banc)).
Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 539 (1985)).
101 Id. (citing United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008)).
102 Id. at 961.
103 Id.
104 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 961.
105 Id. at 962 (discussing Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion).
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the court reasoned, was not applicable in Cotterman’s case because the
search performed was initiated at the actual border.111 By refusing to
classify the forensic examination as either an extended border search or a
functional border search, the court adopted its own standard as it applied
to the search of Cotterman’s computers. The court asserted that “the
comprehensive and intrusive nature” of the forensic examination
necessitated a standard of reasonable suspicion.112
To justify the adoption of a heightened standard, the Ninth Circuit
looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. FloresMontano.113 The Ninth Circuit asserted that Flores-Montano stood for the
proposition that the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment
should control border searches.114 Thus, the Ninth Circuit proclaimed that
such a requirement was necessary, particularly in cases where “searches
of property are so destructive, particularly offensive, or overly intrusive in
the manner in which they are carried out.”115 The court argued that
although the Supreme Court has dealt with a number of border cases over
the past thirty years, none have been instructive as to when a search is
“particularly offensive.”116 The issue first appeared in United States v.
Ramsey,117 but the Court reserved judgment.118 Eight years later, the Court
had occasion to revisit the issue in United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez,119 where the Court stated that such suspicion was necessary
for those searches that went “beyond the scope of a routine customs search
and inspection.”120 Thus, although the Supreme Court ultimately rejected
the privacy claim in Flores-Montano, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
Court’s increased focus on highly intrusive searches, going beyond those
that are simply “routine,” supported the establishment of a reasonableness
standard in certain situations.121
After laying the foundation for a reasonableness requirement, the
Ninth Circuit turned its attention to the privacy interests connected to one’s
personal electronic devices.122 The court asserted that cases like
111
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115 Id. (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152, 154 n.2, 155-56
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Cotterman’s involved the implication of “substantial personal privacy
interests.”123 The court reasoned that “[t]he private information
individuals store on digital devices – their personal ‘papers’ in the words
of the Constitution – stands in stark contrast to the generic and impersonal
contents of a gas tank.”124 The court argued that there were several key
differences between personal electronic devices and other luggage that
could constitute “cargo.”125 For instance, the storage capability of
traditional luggage does not come anywhere close to the amount that one
can store on electronic devices.126
Furthermore, electronic devices “contain the most intimate details of
our lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical
records and private emails.”127 The court used this particular characteristic
to analogize electronic devices to the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of a
person’s right to be secure in their “papers.”128 The court asserted that “[i]t
would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.”129
The court further distinguished between traditional luggage and the
files that are stored on one’s personal electronic device, by exploring a
person’s decision-making process in deciding what kinds of “cargo” to
carry with him or her.130 While a person can decide what to pack in his or
her traditional luggage, the process is not as simple for electronic devices.
The court reasoned that while a person is capable in selecting the physical
items that he or she is travelling with, that same person cannot merely
remove files on their computer because they are impractical to travel
with.131 Furthermore, “the volume and often intermingled nature of the
files” and the fact that “[i]t is also a time-consuming task that may not
even effectively erase the files” led the court to dispel any suggestion that
a person could simply not carry certain files with them.132 Even when one
attempts to delete these files, they may still be retrieved.133 “It is as if a
search of a person’s suitcase could reveal not only what the bag contained
on the current trip, but everything it had carried.”134 Thus, the court
123
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130
131
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reasoned that there is an inherent difference in the selection process
between what a person carries in a personal electronic device versus any
other typical piece of luggage.
In recognizing these unique characteristics of personal electronic
devices, the court explained its reasoning behind advancing a heightened
standard for these types of border searches. The court asserted that it was
not advancing a standard that would make these devices completely “off
limits” to border agents, but rather it was ensuring that if such searches
were to take place, they should be held to a standard of reasonableness.135
The court ultimately asserted that “[i]nternational travelers certainly
expect that their property will be searched at the border.
What they do not expect is that, absent some particularizes suspicion,
agents will mine every last piece of data on their devices or deprive them
of their most personal property for days.”136 The court, borrowing its
definition of reasonable suspicion from United States v. Cortez,137
concluded that the determination of whether or not a search is reasonable
should be made in light of the totality of the circumstances.138
Notwithstanding this reasoning, the court nevertheless found that the
border agents had reasonable suspicion to search Cotterman’s laptops.139
In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the court asserted that
Cotterman’s past child molestation conviction, alone, would not be
enough to give rise to the suspicion necessary to conduct an intrusive
computer forensic examination.140 Similarly, the court rejected the
argument that the existence of password-protected files, alone, would be
enough for reasonable suspicion.141 Because it is commonplace for persons
not involved in criminal activity to protect their files, the court found
password protection itself to be “ubiquitous.”142
Nevertheless, when analyzed in light of a totality of the
circumstances, the court found the aforementioned indicia to weigh in
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Id. at 967 (citing United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1994)).
137 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–19 (1981)(“a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity”).
138 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981)).
139 Id. at 968.
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favor of a finding of reasonableness.143 The following factors, taken
together, ultimately supported the court’s assertion that the border agents
had reasonable suspicion when conducting both the initial search and the
comprehensive forensic examination of Cotterman’s laptop: Cotterman’s
TECS alert; Cotterman’s prior conviction for child molestation;
Cotterman’s frequent travels; the fact that Cotterman was attempting to
cross the border from a country known for sex tourism (Mexico);
Cotterman’s collection of electronic equipment; the fact that Cotterman
had password-protected his files; and the parameters of the system that
was used to identify registered sex offenders.144 Thus, although the Ninth
Circuit ultimately adopted a new standard for border searches of electronic
devices, the border agents who searched Cotterman’s laptop had the
requisite level of suspicion for performing a comprehensive forensic
examination.
C. A Step In The Right Direction: The United States Supreme Court’s
Decision in Riley v. California
Less than a year after the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in
Cotterman, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in two
companion cases whose effects have potential to change the judicial
landscape surrounding warrantless searches of electronic devices.145 In
the first case, David Riley had been pulled over for driving with expired
tags.146 After learning that Riley was also driving with a suspended
license, the officer impounded Riley’s car and arrested Riley after an
inventory search turned up two handguns under the car’s hood.147 An
officer then searched Riley incident to arrest, seizing Riley’s cell phone in
the process.148 The officer looked through the phone, noticing the letters
“CK” appear multiple times, a label which he believed to stand for the
moniker “Crip Killers,” used to describe members of the Bloods gang.149
Thus, two hours later, a detective further examined the phone’s content,
looking for more evidence of gang activity.150 This search ultimately

143 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968. (“Collectors of child pornography can hardly be
expected to clearly label such files and leave them in readily visible and accessible sections
of a computer’s hard drive, particularly when they are traveling through border crossings,
where individuals ordinarily anticipate confronting at least a cursory inspection.”).
144 Id. at 968–70.
145 Riley v. California, 571 U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 999 (2014); United States v. Wurie,
571 U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 999 (2014).
146 Riley v. California, —- U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
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turned up videos and photographs which linked Riley to the Bloods gang
and a car that had been involved in a shooting a few weeks earlier.151
In the companion case, a police officer witnessed Brima Wurie sell
drugs from his car.152 After Wurie was arrested and brought to the police
station, officers seized two cell phones from Wurie’s person.153 The
officers noticed that the phone was receiving phone calls from the same
number, identified as “my house” on the phone’s external screen.154 After
opening the phone and accessing its call log, the officers traced the number
associated with “my house” back to an apartment building.155 Upon
searching the apartment, pursuant to a warrant, the officers found and
seized “215 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a
firearm and ammunition, and cash.”156 Wurie was subsequently charged
based on this evidence.157
The Supreme Court began the opinion by reflecting on its own
precedent regarding searches incident to arrest.158 More relevant to the
present inquiry, however, the Court then highlighted the changes that
advancing technology bring to the Fourth Amendment analysis.159 The
Court reasoned that cell phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent
part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they
were an important feature of human anatomy.”160 Thus, like the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis in Cotterman, the Supreme Court was similarly forced
to focus its analysis on the balance between an individual’s privacy and
the promotion of government interests.161 In doing so, the Court refused
to adopt a mechanical approach to its interpretation of Fourth Amendment
precedent.162 Ultimately, the Court decided that, due to the inherent
differences between a physical search and a search of cell phone
information, officers must secure a warrant before conducting such an
intrusive search.163
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D. Why the Ninth Circuit’s Reasonable Suspicion Standard Should be
Adopted in Light of Riley
As the Ninth Circuit announced in its decision, “[a] person’s digital
life ought not be hijacked simply by crossing a border.”164 While the
Fourth Circuit’s findings in Ickes are persuasive, these findings do not
override what the Supreme Court has established in its border search
doctrine precedent.165 As the doctrine itself has developed, there has been
more reluctance on the Court’s part to follow the blanket rule set forth in
Ramsey.166
There are stark differences between opening someone’s mail and
digging through personal files stored on one’s computer. For instance,
“[e]lectronic devices often retain sensitive and confidential information far
beyond the perceived point of erasure, notably in the form of browsing
histories and records of deleted files.”167 These files cannot be equated to
a traveler’s usual “cargo,” as the Ickes court noted. Computers themselves
work through the interplay of hardware and software components.168 A
computer’s hardware includes “the parts of a computer that you can see
and touch, including the case and everything inside it.”169 While this
aspect of a computer easily fits the definition adopted by the Fourth
Circuit, the computer’s software and files are more difficult to classify as
“goods transported by a vessel, airplane, or vehicle.”170 As opposed to a
computer’s hardware, its “[s]oftware refers to the instructions, or
programs, that tell the hardware what to do.”171 While software may be
seen as “goods” on one level, the differences inherent between the two
components should be taken into account in the larger analysis.
Furthermore, computers are multi-faceted devices. A person’s
computer therefore has endless possibilities in the types of uses and
information associated with it. “In the workplace, many people use
computers to keep records, analyze data, do research, and manage projects.
At home, [they] can use computers to find information, store pictures and
music, track finances, play games, and communicate with others—and
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those are just a few of the possibilities.”172 In order for a border agent to
perform a search with the level of intrusiveness that was found in
Cotterman, it should follow that there was some amount of suspicion on
their part before the search was conducted. Otherwise, virtually every
aspect of a person’s digital life will be available for inspection at the will
of those working at the United States border.
Since Ramsey, Supreme Court precedent has displayed an everincreasing awareness that the border search doctrine is more flexible than
it appears on its face. While the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) is authorized to conduct the “inspection, examination, and search
of vehicles, persons, baggage and merchandise . . . to ensure compliance
with any law or regulation enforced or administered by DHS,”173 the Court
has recognized certain types of searches to necessitate a heightened
standard. Such was the case in Montoya de Hernandez, in which the Court
discussed the need for reasonableness before a border agent performs a
rectal examination.174 While searching a person’s computer is not the
equivalent of a search of a person’s alimentary canal, the emphasis the
Court placed on the intrusive nature of the search is nevertheless
instructive.175
Even when a search is not particularly offensive, “[f]or those pulled
aside for a secondary inspection . . . the experience can be distressing,
resulting in a missed connecting flight, a prolonged interrogation,
and . . . the loss of a laptop necessary for [his or her] livelihood.”176
Distress related to such searches only increases when the search becomes
more intrusive. Around five thousand people were subjected to electronic
media searches between October 1, 2012 and August 31, 2013, which
amounts to about fifteen such searches a day.177 If these numbers continue
to increase without any guidance or restraint, intrusive computer
examinations will become the types of routine searches allowed by
Montoya de Hernandez. This trend is particularly alarming given the
privacy concerns implicated by border searches of electronic devices.

172

Introduction to Computers, supra note 168.
Privacy Impact Assessment for the Border Searches of Electronic Devices, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, at 2 (Aug. 25, 2009).
174 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
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Although addressing a separate exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, Riley provides valuable insight into
how this issue should be viewed moving forward across Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as a whole. As the Supreme Court recognized
in Riley, personal technological devices, such as cell phones, “place vast
quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals.”178
While the Court acknowledged the tremendous government interest in that
information, particularly given concerns regarding the potential loss of
evidence, it also realized that there are other ways to alleviate those
concerns.179 “If ‘the police are truly confronted with a “now or never
situation.’” – for example, circumstances suggesting that a defendant’s
phone will be the target of an imminent remote-wipe attempt – they may
be able to rely on exigent circumstances to search the phone
immediately.”180
By contrast, the privacy concerns implicated in a cell phone search
are far greater than those of physical items that the Supreme Court has
addressed in the past.181 The inherent differences between the two types
of items are apparent. “Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail
they have received for the past several months, every picture they have
taken, or every book or article they have read – nor would they have any
reason to attempt to do so.”182 Thus, the limitations that exist with searches
of physical containers do not apply to personal electronic devices, as
devices like cell phones can store vast amounts of data that would be
impractical, if not impossible, to carry on the person physically.183
Moreover,
[t]he fact that a search in the pre-digital era could have turned up
a photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a search of
thousands of photos in a digital gallery. The fact that someone
could have tucked a paper bank statement in a pocket does not
justify a search of every bank statement from the last five years.
And to make matters worse, such an analogue test would allow
law enforcement to search a range of items contained on a phone,
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even though people would be unlikely to carry such a variety of
information in physical form.184

Searches of electronic devices would also allow access to types of
information that a physical search would never reveal.185 Such
information may not only be on the device itself, but stored remotely on
servers through the ever-increasing use of “cloud computing.”186
As the Court recognized, albeit with a particular focus on cell phones
in the search incident to arrest context, the unique characteristics of one’s
personal electronic devices require that there be some sort of shield against
suspicionless searches, given the tremendous privacy interests at stake.187
That is not to say that security at our nation’s borders is not paramount.188
Rather, there are times when the government must realize that the nature
of certain types of searches goes too far when weighed against an
individual’s privacy interests.189 An intrusive search of one’s personal
electronic devices without at least a minimal requirement of reasonable
suspicion is one of those times. When an “exhaustive forensic search of a
copied laptop hard drive” is performed, it “intrudes upon privacy and
dignity interests to a far greater degree than a cursory search at the
border.”190 Such a search should be held to the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, rather than falling under the
general exemption of the border search doctrine.191 The reasonable
suspicion standard advanced by the Ninth Circuit should, thus, be adopted
by the Supreme Court in order to resolve this circuit split.

184 Id. at 2493; see also id. at 2489 (describing the variety of information that a cell
phone search could reveal about an individual).
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187 See Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2494–95 (stating that “[t]he fact that technology now allows
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191 See United States v. Saboonchi, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102261 at *13 (D. Md. July
28, 2014)(reasoning that while Riley is inapplicable to border searches, the court still held
that “[a]n invasive and warrantless border search may occur on no more than reasonable
suspicion . . . .”).
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PART IV: CONCLUSION
With the growth and development of technology, the law must
evolve to reflect the changing times. No longer should courts be able to
hold onto strict applications of rules that were created before certain
technologies came into existence. The border search doctrine is one of
those rules that must develop accordingly. The reasonable suspicion
standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cotterman
properly addresses the privacy concerns associated with one’s digital life,
while maintaining the tremendous need for security at United States
borders. It ensures that individuals at our borders maintain some level of
personal and digital dignity. Any lesser standard would subject every
international traveler to “[what is] essentially a computer strip search.”192
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